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I. Introduction
Lyman Johnson has made major contributions in thinking
about both duty and purpose in corporations.1 He has also been
* Dorsey & Whitney Chair and Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. The Author thanks Paul Rubin and participants at the Washington and Lee
Law Review Symposium, entitled Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute
to the Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon, for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
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one of the very few corporate law scholars to write about the role
of religious belief in motivating both corporations collectively and
individual officers and directors within corporations.2 These
various contributions are interlinked. Johnson has a vision of
corporations pursuing plural visions of collective goods, not
limited by the shareholder value maximization norm that has
come to prevail in thinking about American corporate law. A
strong moral vision rooted in religious belief underlies that
project.
This project is worth exploring from a variety of perspectives.
After all, the dominant economic approach to corporate law is not
exactly known for the depth or subtlety of its understanding of
human psychology and the common good. Religious thought has a
vast cumulative reservoir of reflection on human good and evil,
individual and collective. What can we learn by examining
corporate law from a religious point of view? How does a religious
understanding of human nature affect an analysis of how
directors and officers are likely to respond to their fiduciary
duties? How does a religious understanding of collective action
and enterprise affect our vision of corporate purpose? If our
answers to those questions change our understanding of how
corporations may (or may not) pursue the public interest, how
does that in turn reflect an analysis of how the state should
regulate business, and in particular, how it should regulate
religiously-guided businesses whose core beliefs may in some
ways conflict with some legal regulations? This Article addresses
those questions by drawing on three different theologians with
differing perspectives: Walter Rauschenbusch, Michael Novak,
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) (arguing that the business
judgment rule “does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the
same broad manner in which it is applied to directors”); Lyman Johnson,
Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 849 [hereinafter Johnson, Counter-Narrative]
(discussing the “story” told by corporate law through a “master narrative” and
“equity’s counter-narrative”); Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 408 (2013)
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness] (exploring “fundamental issues” of
corporate law relating to the business judgment rule and mandated corporate
purpose).
2. See Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting Corporate Law, 1 WM. & MARY
BUS. L.J. 83, 87 (2010) (exploring the “possible implications of continuing, widespread religious enchantment for the modern corporation”).
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and Reinhold Niebuhr. The first two of these figures resemble—
but deepen—perspectives already widely developed with
contemporary corporate law scholarship.3 The third figure,
Niebuhr, is more novel, and poses some hard questions for
corporate law scholars of varying perspectives.4
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II outlines the two
broad leading secular perspectives that dominate corporate law
scholarship.5 Most significant is the contractarian approach.6
This approach assumes individual self-interest as the leading
motivation of corporate directors, officers, and employees, and
emphasizes how contractual and market mechanisms can help
constrain and harness self-interest to produce social benefits with
only light regulation.7 The contractarian approach has dominated
American corporate law scholarship since the 1980s.8 A
subordinate but still significant alternative is what I will call the
communitarian approach.9 This approach takes a more optimistic
view of individuals but a less optimistic view of corporations. It
posits that individuals can be motivated by more other-regarding
reasons to act, up to a point.10 And it is a good thing too, because
the approach argues that markets frequently do not work as well
to harness individual greed as the contractarian approach
3. See infra Part III.A–B (reviewing the contributions of Walter
Rauschenbusch and Michael Novak).
4. See infra Part III.C (distinguishing Reinhold Niebuhr’s work from the
other scholars).
5. See infra Part II (outlining the contractarian and communitarian
approaches to corporate law).
6. I will sometimes call this the libertarian approach when I want to
emphasize its normative thrust. It is also commonly called the law and
economics approach. See Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and
Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee
Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2003) (referring to the “contractarian law
and economics” approach).
7. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (providing that the most
compelling social task of business is to maximize profits).
8. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (providing the leading classical
statement of this approach in a relatively pure version).
9. I will sometimes call this the progressive approach when I want to
emphasize its normative thrust.
10. See infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing historical and
modern evaluations of the communitarian approach).
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supposes. This suggests both an important role for corporate
social responsibility, but also for state regulation to guard against
harms.11
Part III introduces the three religious perspectives.12 It
compares and contrasts those perspectives in their understanding
of individual and collective behavior.13 Walter Rauschenbusch
was the leading figure of the Social Gospel movement of the early
twentieth century.14 He emphasized the social nature and goals of
religion, and reacted strongly against what he perceived as major
social injustices brought on by industrialization and the growth of
big businesses during his time.15 He saw persons as sinners but
able to improve themselves and work for the public good if the
social environment is reformed.16 The Social Gospel movement
was closely tied to the Progressive movement in politics, and
supported the regulatory reforms of Progressivism. I argue that
this vision fits pretty closely with the modern corporate
communitarian vision that Lyman Johnson has helped develop.
Michael Novak is a contemporary Catholic philosopher best
known for his book The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism.17 He
gives a religious defense of a relatively conservative, free-market
approach to economics and corporations.18 Although humans are
far from purely selfish, markets and free enterprises can usefully
harness self-interest to benefit the public good in ways that
economists since Adam Smith have analyzed in detail.19
11. A leading source for this approach is PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
12. See infra Part III (exploring concepts of “individual personality and sin,
the relationship between individuals and the community, and on the role of
corporations in society”).
13. Infra Part III.
14. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (describing the influence
and import of the Social Gospel movement).
15. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (detailing the focuses of the
Social Gospel movement).
16. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Rauschenbusch’s
conceptions of sin and salvation in terms of corporate practice).
17. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982)
[hereinafter NOVAK, SPIRIT].
18. See id. at 28 (“Democratic capitalism is neither the Kingdom of God nor
without sin. Yet all other known systems of political economy are worse.”).
19. See id. at 113 (discussing Adam Smith’s writings and contribution to
economic discourse).
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Corporations are a part of this system, though they also rely upon
and generate social norms and behavior. A healthy respect for
seeking profit is fine with Novak, who thus fits pretty well with
the contractarian vision.
Our third figure, Reinhold Niebuhr, is harder to peg
politically and analytically. His Christian realism sees selfcentered pride as a central feature of human existence.20 Persons
can and do strive to rise above such selfishness, but they can
never fully succeed. They rise above themselves by acting within
groups, including economic enterprises, but such collective action
is morally ambiguous: the groups themselves often become quite
grasping and greedy vis-à-vis other groups. Niebuhr is thus less
optimistic about individual character and political organization
than Rauschenbusch and less optimistic about emergent market
outcomes than Novak.
Part IV applies the ideas of these three thinkers to questions
of corporate duty and purpose.21 As for duty, Rauschenbusch
provides some support for the communitarian emphasis on norms
to guide fiduciaries to act faithfully. Novak suggests that internal
needs and constraints will tend to guide managers, and is
skeptical about state intervention in the affairs of business.22
Niebuhr suggests reasons why prideful CEOs may conflate their
own interests with those of the corporation, without a lot of
reason to suspect state intervention will change that.23 As for
purpose, Rauschenbusch gives some reason to hope that
managers can become stewards to promote the general public
good (though plenty of reason to be skeptical, too).24 Novak gives
some reason to believe that a norm of faithfully pursuing the long
20. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (outlining Niebuhr’s moral
philosophy).
21. See infra Part IV (evaluating the implications of Novak,
Rauschenbusch, and Niebuhr’s work on corporate purpose and duty).
22. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 131–33 (discussing the importance
of managers’ understandings of the operations of a corporation).
23. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 274–75
(1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN] (“The interests of the individuals are,
in other words, never exactly identical with those of their communities.”).
24. See WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS 386
(1907) [hereinafter RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS] (opining on government
interference and whether such interference is an effective method to promote
moral behavior).

1048

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017)

term interests of shareholders will benefit the general public.25
Niebuhr suggests that expecting managers to genuinely pursue
the general public good is probably expecting too much, while a
norm of shareholder wealth maximization could push managers
to harm other interests beyond what is actually even good for
shareholders.26
Part V considers regulation and pluralism.27 All three
perspectives support at least some regulation to constrain
corporate actions, with Rauschenbusch generally supporting the
most regulation and Novak the least.28 Niebuhr’s position seems
rather indeterminate: internal corporate restraint and market
incentives are unlikely to lead to good behavior most of the time,
but the political process is not necessarily trustworthy to lead to
improvements through regulation.29
As the regulatory state expands, we see more conflicts
between well-meant rules and the religiously-guided actions of
some enterprises in a pluralistic world with competing visions of
the good.30 To what extent should the state provide regulatory
accommodations when such conflicts arise? That is the issue

25. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (discussing how shareholder
self-interest acts as a vehicle for maintaining the integrity of a corporation).
26. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 117–18 (discussing how
those with privilege justify their self-interest by pointing to the necessity of
their skills while also denying lower classes opportunities to advance). It is
perhaps already becoming clear that Christian realism could well be labeled
Christian pessimism.
27. See infra Part V (considering how the approaches of Novak, Niebuhr,
and Rauschenbusch affect regulations and pluralism as methods of controlling
corporate behavior).
28. Compare MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 26
(1981) (“The economic system must not become subordinate to the political or
religious system.”), with RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386
(“The present movement for federal and state interference and control over
corporations . . . is an effort to reassert the ownership and mastership of the
people and to force these stewards of public powers back into the position of
public servants.”).
29. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 20–21 (arguing that the
power of government would merely replace the power of corporations).
30. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1377–81 (1993) (addressing the
corporate approach of shareholder primacy in comparison to an approach
focusing on increasing public good).
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raised so contentiously in the Hobby Lobby case.31 How would our
three thinkers answer that question? I suspect Novak would
support fairly expansive accommodation; the answers of
Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr are less clear, though I find
elements in the thought of each that supports the position
favoring some accommodation that both Johnson and I have
defended.32
Part VI concludes that we have much to learn from
Rauschenbusch, Novak, and Niebuhr, and we need not choose
just one over the other two. In many important ways they
complement each other. Rauschenbusch and Novak provide fewer
truly original arguments for corporate law scholars, as they each
fit pretty neatly within one of the current prevailing
perspectives.33 Niebuhr does not fit as well, which makes him
more interesting.34 I think he suggests that we should be less
confident that either markets, morals, or rules can prevent
corporations from imposing major harms on internal or external
constituents.35 Rather, we should perhaps put greater focus on an
additional set of governance strategies, giving affected persons
(especially employees) a direct say in decisions that affect them.
II. Contractarian and Communitarian Approaches
To understand how the differing theological perspectives
both fit with and contrast with existing dominant understandings
of corporate law, it helps to briefly outline the two leading schools
of thought—contractarian and communitarian. For each school of
31. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(deciding whether the Department of Health and Human Services may require
closely held corporations to provide insurance for contraception in violation of
the religious beliefs of the owners of those companies).
32. See infra Part IV.A (summarizing each theorist’s opinions on changes to
the corporate law system).
33. See infra Part III.A (detailing Rauschenbusch’s communitarian
approach); infra Part III.B (outlining the contractarian views of Novak).
34. See infra Part III.C (describing Niebuhr’s approach as “Christian
realism”).
35. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that Niebuhr takes a pessimistic
approach in that he distrusts power as a whole, rather than one individual
source of power).
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thought the analysis starts by considering core assumptions
about individual interest-seeking behavior. It then moves on to
consider how each approach understands the regulation of
self-seeking behavior internally, and how individual behavior
typically translates into collective outcomes.
A. Contractarianism
The dominant way that most American scholars today
understand corporate law is the contractarian approach, often
called the law and economics approach, and which I will also
occasionally refer to as the libertarian approach when I want to
emphasis its normative thrust. Rooted in Ronald Coase’s classic
article on the theory of the firm,36 this approach began to get
traction in corporate law scholarship in the sixties with several
articles and books by Henry Manne.37 It picked up with articles
by a variety of scholars in the seventies and eighties, getting a
classic early statement in The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel.38 In varied
stronger and more diluted forms, the contractarian approach now
suffuses most American corporate law scholarship.39
The contractarian approach starts with a vision of the
individual as rationally seeking to advance her own preferred
interests.40 At its true core, those interests are assumed to be

36. See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386
(1937) (arguing that corporations replace contract-based market transactions
only when doing so would decrease transaction costs).
37. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966) (focusing in part on the effects of different legal rules on trading
and the difficulty of policing those rules); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (arguing that market
forces, more than governmental antitrust regulations, decrease the negative
impacts of mergers).
38. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 1–39 (discussing the
molding of the corporate form and its reliance on contract analysis).
39. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377 (noting an increase in scholarship
debating a potential shift from the current shareholder-primacy approach).
40. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 6 (summarizing the
dynamic of the corporate form as beginning with self-interested managers and
investors).
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purely selfish, often focused on financial interests.41 More
abstract versions of the theory allow for a very broad range of
interests, which can include promoting the well-being of others.42
But the self-centered version of the theory typically guides
thinking within corporate law scholarship. Persons are assumed
to pursue their interests rationally and effectively, although more
nuanced versions of the theory allow for various imperfections.43
In considering agency problems within businesses, this
approach focuses on properly aligning incentives, so that selfinterested agents will not unduly subordinate the interests of the
business to their own.44 Compensation, monitoring, governance,
and reputational mechanisms, along with other contractual and
market means, help guard against excessive opportunity.45
Governmental regulation can help, but can easily go too far or not
properly align incentives.46 Fiduciary duty is a leading form of
such regulation, but contractarian purists think duty should be a
default but not mandatory rule.47
As far as advancing public goods goes, the contractarian
approach in essence believes in the invisible hand of Adam
Smith.48 The selfish pursuit of profit by individual actors in the
market will tend to benefit all.49 Indeed, the contractarians go
41. See id. (noting that entrepreneurs are driven by the desire to prevent
personal loss).
42. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1378 n.19 (explaining that contractarian
opinions vary widely on their opinions of social rights and government
interference in the corporate context).
43. See id. (identifying Rawls as one contractarian whose views would
“resonate strongly with the rights-based views of corporate law
communitarians”).
44. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 9 (suggesting that unless
an employee receives “all the rewards of success and penalties of failure,” he
may lack incentive to fully support the corporation’s venture).
45. See id. (“Another way around the difficulty of monitoring the work of
the firm’s employees is to give each the right to some profits from the firm’s
success. Each will then work hard and monitor the work of colleagues, lest their
subpar performance reduce his rewards.”).
46. Millon, supra note 30, at 1382.
47. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 90 (noting that
corporations are “enduring contracts” and that if a contract is written well
enough, fiduciary duties become unnecessary).
48. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 37–43 (Seven Treasures
Publications 2009) (describing how the market limits individual greed).
49. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 4 (“Managers may do
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beyond Smith in believing this remains true, even adding
corporations as collective actors within the market system—
Smith himself thought agency problems within joint stock
companies were generally disabling.50 The full, pure vision tying
individual self-interest, corporate profit maximization, and the
general public good is well laid out in Milton Friedman’s classic
article, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its
Profits.51
Even Friedman did not believe in a purely laissez-faire
system.52 There will always be some externalities not captured by
market prices, so that pure profit seeking will impose some
harms on others.53 Some governmental regulation is needed to
address those externalities.54 But believers in the contractarian
approach think that regulation will not be needed in many areas,
and that political processes too frequently tend to lead to
unnecessary, inefficient legal rules.55
B. Communitarianism
Opposing the dominant approach is the loyal opposition, the
communitarian approach. In its current version in American law
it was given important articulation in a volume of essays edited
by Larry Mitchell called Progressive Corporate Law.56 A related
their best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics
of the market drive them to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart. It is
almost as if there were an invisible hand.”).
50. See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Adam Smith’s Analysis of
Joint-Stock Companies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1237, 1254 (1982) (“The basic problem
with the joint-stock firm in Smith’s analysis was poor adaptability due to agency
cost problems.”).
51. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 1970.
52. See id. (warning against government intervention, but admitting, “I do
not see how one can avoid the use of the political mechanism altogether”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377–78 (noting that contractarians would
instead leave decision-making to the parties to corporate contracts).
56. See generally MITCHELL, supra note 11 (arguing that corporations can
no longer be viewed as private institutions, but must instead be viewed as
having public obligations).
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influential theory is the team production theory of Margaret Blair
and Lynn Stout.57 A more recent major statement of elements of
this approach is Kent Greenfield’s book, The Failure of Corporate
Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities.58
The communitarian approach differs both in its theory of
persons and of collective action.59 Stated briefly, it tends to
believe that persons are better and markets are worse than the
contractarian approach assumes.60 Though self-interest is
certainly an important motivator for virtually all persons, the
communitarian approach believes that persons are more sociable,
and their preferences are more malleable, than is typically
presumed by contractarians.61 Social norms of faithfulness and
pursuing the public good can play a major role in guiding
behavior.62 That is not to say that humans can become
super-humanly virtuous, but they can become humanly virtuous.
Social circumstances crucially affect the quality and strength of
norms. Thus, creating social institutions—including business
associations—that encourage positive norms becomes an
important goal of public policy.
Norms thus become an important focus in addressing agency
problems within corporations. Incentives tied to self-interest
matter too, no question, but if persons believe they are working in
just institutions, they will in many circumstances faithfully
pursue the best interests of those institutions even where not
57. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 265–69 (1999) (analyzing corporate law
through the lens of a venture designed to maximize the welfare of the entirety of
the business team, rather than individual investors).
58. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) (cataloging the past
failures of corporate law and proposing change).
59. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1378 (defining communitarians as those
who rely more heavily on legal rules to mitigate harmful effects experienced by
non-shareholders).
60. See id. at 1378 n.20 (“[I]t is possible to retain a commitment to the
moral value of individual autonomy and choice while nevertheless rejecting the
market as a sufficient solution to all problems.”).
61. See id. at 1379 (distinguishing communitarians as focusing on the
public effects of corporate behavior, rather than on internal corporate
relationships).
62. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 855 (recognizing that
the norms of officers and directors largely guide their behaviors).
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doing so could personally enrich the agents.63 Norm-based
internalization of the good of the institution is more efficient than
the use of costly incentive mechanisms.64 Law, including fiduciary
duty law, can play a significant role in shaping strong norms.
Through a similar argument, communitarians believe that
corporate officers and directors can and should consider the best
interests of a variety of corporate stakeholders, not just
shareholders, in deciding how the corporation should act.65
Communitarians tend to think that externalities are severe and
widespread.66 Corporate behavior deeply affects the interests of
all sorts of persons and groups, and market prices cannot fully
capture all of those effects by a long shot.67 A significant degree of
regulation is needed to stop corporations from imposing harms on
others, but the more that corporations faithfully pursue a broad
stakeholder vision, the less need there will be for intrusive
regulations.68 And there will also be less need to exercise
expensive enforcement of what regulations are still needed,
because stakeholder corporate managers will be more likely to
voluntarily comply with legal rules without the threat of being
caught in violations. Some versions of communitarian theory also
stress the benefits from involving groups other than
shareholders, especially employees, involved in making corporate
decisions, at various levels.69
Of course, not all writing on corporate law falls neatly into
one or the other of these two approaches. Not even all writing
with a strong normative dimension falls into one or the other.
63. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1382 (asserting that communitarians will
feel a sense of obligation in the absence of contract, through merely their
membership in a community).
64. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857.
65. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1379 (illustrating this point by noting that
Time Inc. rejected an offer that would have largely benefitted shareholders
because it would have had such a negative impact on Time employees).
66. Id. at 1382.
67. Id. at 1379.
68. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857 (alluding to moral
standards of corporations as the appropriate method to reduce corporate
self-interest and promote public service).
69. See GREENFIELD, supra note 58, at 163 (suggesting that if employees
can trust that a business cares about them, they will be more likely to obey
company rules).

BETWEEN SIN AND REDEMPTION

1055

There is much disagreement and variation within each approach,
with some scholars articulating purer and more extreme versions
of their approaches than others. Some writing contains
significant elements of each approach, and other writing does not
fit into either category.70 Still, much contemporary writing on
corporate law can be usefully classified as following one or the
other of these two approaches.71
III. Religious Views of Human Nature and Collective Action
I now move to a consideration of our three religious thinkers.
In this Part, I lay out the core ideas of each concerning individual
personality and sin, the relationship between individuals and the
community, and on the role of corporations in society. In Part IV,
I will apply those core ideas to issues of fiduciary duty, corporate
purpose, and regulation.
A. Rauschenbusch
Let us start with the religious thinker who is closest to
Lyman Johnson’s work, and to the communitarian approach in
corporate law. Walter Rauschenbusch was the leading figure in
the Social Gospel movement of the early twentieth century. The
Social Gospel movement tried to move the focus of Christian
churches from questions of individual morals and salvation to the
pressing social issues of the time, including mass
industrialization and growing inequality.72 Of Rauschenbusch’s
two leading books, the first, Christianity and the Social Crisis,
focused on a historical account of Christianity culminating in
extended analysis of the economic problems of his time.73 The
70. Compare
NOVAK,
THEOLOGY,
supra
note
28
(discussing
contractarianism), and RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24 (detailing
communitarianism), with NIEBUHR, supra note 26 (casting doubt on both
theories).
71. See Millon, supra note 30, at 1377 (characterizing the two competing
ideals as creating a “rift” of disagreement).
72. See WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 1–9
(1917) [hereinafter RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL] (introducing the social
gospel as a novel movement placing more emphasis on service to others).
73. See generally RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24.
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second, A Theology for the Social Gospel, tried to give a more
philosophically and theologically grounded argument for the
Social Gospel.74
For Rauschenbusch, sin is putting one’s selfish gains over
the good of mankind.75 Profit-seeking does not come out looking
good.
We love and serve God when we love and serve our fellows,
whom he loves and in whom he lives. We rebel against God
and repudiate his will when we set our profit and ambition
above the welfare of our fellows and above the Kingdom of
God which binds them together.76

If sin is selfishness, and salvation is serving others, then
the Social Gospel focuses Christianity’s attention on improving
the state of society.
As soon as the desire for salvation becomes strong and
intelligent enough to look beyond the personal sins of the
individual, and to discern how our personality in its intake
and output is connected with the social groups to which we
belong, the problem of social redemption is before us and we
can never again forget it.77

And this is not just about each individual saving themselves by
striving to do good—the justice of social institutions themselves
is critical. Rauschenbusch explains, “[i]t is not enough to think
of the Kingdom as a prevalence of good will. The institutions of
life must be fundamentally fraternal and co-operative if they are
to train men to love their fellowmen as coworkers.” 78
As we have seen above and will discuss more below, the
communitarian approach to corporate law focuses on the role of
social
norms
in
encouraging
pro-social
behavior.79

74. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 1 (“The social
gospel needs a theology to make it effective; but theology needs the social gospel
to vitalize it.”).
75. See id. at 47 (“The definition of sin as selfishness furnishes an excellent
theological basis for social conception of sin and salvation.”).
76. Id. at 48.
77. Id. at 24.
78. Id. at 54.
79. See generally Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1 (advocating for
a normative approach to corporate law).
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Rauschenbusch does as well.80 And he stresses that those norms
are themselves social constructs.81
A theology for the social gospel would have to say that original
sin is partly social. It runs down the generations not only by
biological propagation but also by social assimilation.
....
In the main the individual takes over his moral judgments and
valuations from his social class, profession, neighbourhood,
and nation, making only slight personal modifications in the
group standards.82

Rauschenbusch’s emphasis on social institutions and seeking
the good of others leads to a political program that is somewhere
between the progressivism of his time and full-fledged socialism.
He frequently focuses on workers and their mistreatment by the
corporations of his time.83 As we shall discuss in more detail
below, sometimes he calls for better behavior by managers, but
other times he calls for labor unions, cooperatives, and state
ownership to boost the power of labor and limit the power of
capital.84 Thus, Rauschenbusch suggests a variety of possible
ways to limit corporate power, but he most certainly does not
believe a la Friedman that largely unregulated profit-seeking
corporations will mostly lead to outcomes that benefit mankind
and society.85

80. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 57–68
(discussing sin as a barrier to social advancement).
81. See id. (suggesting that instead of dismissing sinful behavior as forces
of evil, which tends to idealize immoral behavior, society could improve by
promoting behavior that meets religious norms).
82. Id. at 61.
83. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07
(discussing the continuing struggle of the working class to gain only nominal
advancement in comparison to corporate owners).
84. See, e.g., id. at 400–11 (calling for a movement of the working class
while also recognizing a need for cooperation between workers and owners).
85. Compare id. at 386–87 (referring to government regulation and
Christian stewardship as two ways to reassert public rights in corporations),
with Friedman, supra note 51 (suggesting that a free-enterprise, market
approach will most effectively promote positive social ends).

1058

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017)
B. Novak

For a religious thinker who comes much closer to Friedman’s
vision, we turn to Michael Novak. Novak is a Catholic
philosopher, whose major work is The Spirit of Democratic
Capitalism.86 Also quite relevant for our topic is Toward a
Theology of the Corporation.87 Novak defends a pluralistic vision
of capitalism.88 He has a much more benign view than
Rauschenbusch of the role of corporations in our capitalist
system.89
Like Rauschenbusch, Novak recognizes the self-centeredness
of human beings that is at the core of the Christian concept of
sin.90 However, he recommends quite different political strategies
for addressing that self-centeredness. For one, he sees it as an
argument for pluralism and the value of multiple power centers
within a society.91 Novak argues that “[t]he perception of each of
us is regularly more self-centered than our ideal selves can
plausibly commend. We are not often as objective as we would
like to be. That is why the separation of systems is appropriate to
our weakness.”92 He fears socialism because it centralizes power
in the state.93

86. See generally NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17 (viewing the ideal of
democratic capitalism through a religious lens).
87. See generally NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28 (seeking to further a
debate about religion as a force in world affairs through a discussion of
Christianity in corporations).
88. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 49 (acknowledging that pluralism
distinguishes democratic capitalism from other forms of political economies).
89. Compare id. at 92–93 (advancing the theory that market forces may
adequately control corporate behavior and benefit society), with
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386–87 (calling for
government regulation with an eye toward social interests).
90. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 92 (“A system committed to the
principle that individuals are best placed to judge their real interests for
themselves may be accused of institutionalizing selfishness and greed . . . .”).
91. See id. at 91–92 (identifying family, work, laws, and factions as
necessities to democratic capitalism).
92. Id. at 353.
93. Id. at 190–91.
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Novak also follows Adam Smith in arguing that selfishness
can be usefully harnessed to benefit the public within a free
market system.94
Yet if one keeps uppermost in mind the material needs of the
poor, the hungry, and the oppressed, rather than one’s own
state of feelings, one asks: What is the most effective, practical
way of raising the wealth of nations? What causes wealth? I
have come to think that the dream of democratic socialism is
inferior to the dream of democratic capitalism, and that the
latter’s superiority in actual practice is undeniable. 95 Toward
the desired moral outcome, the exercise of rational
self-interest on the part of every citizen is, in the real world of
historical examples, a far more successful means than the
exercise of other motivations. 96

But Novak does not see humans in capitalist society as
purely self-centered and self-seeking—far from it.97 In fact, he
thinks commerce and life within corporations actually generates
much regard for the interests of others.98 Novak maintains that
“[s]uccessful management in a large firm depends upon an ability
to understand people, to inspire, and to draw the best out of
them.”99 Additionally, he advocates that “[t]he ideals of
democratic capitalism are not purely individualist, either, for the
corporation draws upon and requires highly developed social
skills like mutual trust, teamwork, compromise, cooperation,
creativity, originality and inventiveness, and agreeable
management and personnel relations.”100 Indeed, for many
workers, corporations are a central source of community. Novak
explains, “For many millions of religious persons the daily milieu
in which they work out their salvation is the communal,
corporate world of the workplace. For many, the workplace is a

94. See id. at 79–80 (suggesting that “[i]n the real world, moral motives do
not suffice”).
95. Id. at 26.
96. Id. at 79.
97. See id. at 93 (“The real interests of individuals . . . are seldom merely
self-regarding.”).
98. See id. (identifying family, community, and sympathy as other
motivators).
99. Id. at 47.
100. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 52.
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kind of second family. Even those who hate their work often like
their co-workers.”101
Like Friedman, Novak believes that there is some need for
state regulation of the economy to prevent corporations from
imposing harms on others.102 But also like Friedman, he believes
that the need for regulation is limited.103
In some areas, no doubt, the political system will wish to have
its say in economic affairs. Smith gave many examples in
which he judged such political intervention useful and
commendable. There can be no doubt, however, about the main
thrust of Smith’s argument: that markets as free as possible
from governmental and religious command best serve the
common good. Such a system frees the intelligence,
imagination, and enterprise of individuals to explore the
possibilities inherent in world process . . . .104

Thus, Novak’s general philosophy of democratic capitalism is
closely related to, and draws upon, the contractarian approach to
corporations.
C. Niebuhr
Our final religious thinker is Reinhold Niebuhr, with his
philosophy of Christian realism. Niebuhr’s early book, Moral Man
and Immoral Society,105 is perhaps his most striking and
influential foray into social analysis, while The Nature and
Destiny of Man106 is the most comprehensive statement of his
theology.
101. Id. at 41.
102. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 80 (admitting that self-interest
alone may not be sufficient).
103. See id. at 84 (warning against the politicization of moral and cultural
issues).
104. Id. at 79.
105. See generally NIEBUHR, supra note 26 (suggesting that individuals have
the capacity to act morally, but that entering into social groups reduces the
ability to refrain from self-interested behavior).
106. See generally 1 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN
(1941) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, NATURE] (purporting to provide a theory of human
nature from a Christian perspective); 2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND
DESTINY OF MAN (1943) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, DESTINY] (analyzing Christian
concepts of redemption and human destiny).
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Like so many, Niebuhr sees self-centeredness and pride as
the fundamental source of sin.107 Humans can and do strive to see
and act beyond themselves, but these efforts are always
imperfect. Worse, they are typically more imperfect than we know
them to be. Niebuhr proposes that “[i]t is characteristic of human
nature, whether in its individual or collective expression, that it
has no possibility of exercising power, without running the
danger of overestimating the purity of the wisdom which directs
it.”108
One would think that acting together in communal groups
would then be a critical element in moving beyond self-centered
sin, as Rauschenbusch believed.109 And there is indeed something
to that. But for Niebuhr, there is a cruel paradox in collective
organizations. The very focus of energy that takes the
participants beyond themselves makes them more suspicious and
hostile towards those outside the collective.110 “In every human
group,” he notes, “there is less reason to guide and to check
impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to
comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained
egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in
their personal relationships.”111 He asserts, “The moral
obtuseness of human collectives makes a morality of pure
disinterestedness impossible. There is not enough imagination in
any social group to render it amenable to the influence of pure
love.”112 Hence the title of Niebuhr’s most famous book, with the
attempts of moral men leading to an immoral society. It is the
opposite of the dynamic asserted by Smith and Novak, whereby
individual pursuit of self-interest leads to good social outcomes.113
107. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that religion condemns
selfishness).
108. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 132 (1952).
109. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 402 (promoting
cooperation among social classes to move away from self-interest and toward
social gain).
110. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 272 (“The selfishness of human
communities must be regarded as an inevitability.”).
111. Id. at xi.
112. Id. at 272.
113. See supra Part III.B (comparing the contractarian views of Smith and
Novak).
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The contractarian position could be summed up as “immoral man
and moral society,” but Niebuhr posits the reverse.114
The immorality of groups flows in significant part from the
behavior of their leaders. Those leaders naturally tend to see
their power as justified by their virtues, more than is in fact the
case (even if it is somewhat true, it is less true than the leaders
want to believe).115 Niebuhr notes that “[t]he simple religious
insight which underlies these prophetic judgments is that the
men who are tempted by their eminence and by the possession of
undue power become more guilty of pride and of injustice than
those who lack power and position.”116
Although Niebuhr is thus far less optimistic than Novak that
collective corporate action within markets will lead to socially
optimal outcomes, he is also less optimistic than Rauschenbusch
about the potential for political intervention, either via regulation
or socialist ownership.117 When the oppressed organize to improve
their lot and succeed, the logic of collective action will cause them
in turn to oppress others, and their leaders to take advantage of
their positions.118
A too simple social radicalism does not recognize how quickly
the poor, the weak, the despised of yesterday, may, on gaining
a social victory over their detractors, exhibit the same
arrogance and the same will-to-power which they abhorred in
their opponents and which they were inclined to regard as a
congenital sin of their enemies.119

By now, one may have noticed that Niebuhr’s Christian
realism could just as well, and maybe better, be labeled Christian
pessimism. Niebuhr is harder to fit within existing corporate law
114. See generally NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at xi (positing the
theory that societal competition can create immorality even among moral
individuals).
115. See id. at 272–74 (discussing the effect of individual morality on group
leaders).
116. NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 223.
117. See NIEBUHR, DESTINY, supra note 106, at 40 (stating one religious
criticism of legalism is that “[l]aw cannot restrain evil; for the freedom of man is
such that he can make the keeping of the law the instrument of evil”).
118. See NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 226 (“[M]oral pride among the
weak will accentuate their arrogance when the fortunes of history transmute
their weakness into strength.”).
119. Id.
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scholarly orthodoxy than either Rauschenbusch or Novak. He is
neither communitarian nor contractarian. He is a skeptic about
all of the leading prescriptions about what corporate, and other
law, should or should not do to constrain corporate behavior.120
IV.

Implications for Corporate Duty and Purpose

We have now briefly examined the core philosophies of our
three religious thinkers, Rauschenbusch, Novak, and Niebuhr.
Each approaches the relationship between individual
self-centeredness and collective action in organizations like
corporations quite differently. Each has a different take on how
well corporations will typically pursue the collective good, and on
the wisdom of extensive state intervention to correct corporate
behavior. We now turn to consider how these differing
understandings of individuals and collectives can provide
differing perspectives on corporate duty and corporate purpose.
A. Corporate Duty
Most corporate law scholarship—at least since the time of
Berle and Means121—has focused on the principal-agent problem
as the core issue that corporate law aims to address.122 And most
attention has focused on fiduciary duty as a way to discipline
directors and officers who put their own interests in financial
gain or leisure over the interests of the corporation.123 Lyman
Johnson has used a religious perspective to provide a distinctive
slant on the potential for fiduciary duty to shape behavior.124
120. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 40–41 (discussing the
limited ability of morality and reason to overcome egoistic behavior).
121. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the separation of
ownership and control in the corporate setting).
122. See id. at 112–16 (recalling the emergence of managers as agents with
control in business settings).
123. See id. at 196–206 (addressing the legal position of management as
fiduciaries to the corporation).
124. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 857 (comparing
fiduciary duties to the “Golden Rule” of the New Testament).
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Most scholarship assumes a law and economics approach to
duty.125 The possibility of being sued for a duty violation imposes
a potential cost on enriching oneself at the expense of one’s
company, and rational agents balance that expected cost against
the gains of violating their duty, and will be deterred if the
expected costs of a duty violation are high enough relative to the
gains.126 Moving beyond the economic paradigm, Johnson
suggests a major role for morality and norms.127
Religiously-guided business leaders may adhere to an “ethics of
stewardship” that prevents them from enriching themselves even
when doing so would be economically rational assuming personal
financial gain as the primary goal.128
Johnson further argues, in an important paper, that
fiduciary duty court opinions can help shape ethical norms.129
Building on the work of Edward Rock,130 Johnson says that
judges write in judgmental language that resembles sermons and
parables.131 The tie to religious narrative and persuasion
pervades Johnson’s entire analysis.132
125. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the
contract-based approach to corporate management common in corporate law).
126. See id. at 1–4 (discussing the potential for misconduct among managers
and how duty and incentives through appropriate contracts will discourage this
conduct).
127. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 93 (“Perhaps ‘faith-based’ initiatives in
the private sector . . . warrant serious consideration as an approach to
upgrading corporate morality.”).
128. See id. at 98 (refuting the contractarian theory that private actors must
be self-seeking, instead suggesting they may value integrity and a commitment
to serving others).
129. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 851 (“Delaware courts
expound on the fiduciary duties of directors through ‘fact-intensive, normatively
saturated’ descriptions of saintly and sinful conduct.”).
130. See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (differentiating between
standards and rules by comparing Delaware court opinions to parables or
sermons). Note the title—Rock too is influenced by religious thought. Claire Hill
and I have explored similar ideas concerning the role of duty cases in
influencing norms in Penumbra. See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive
Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 333, 336 (2009) (discussing “why law on the books and as
enforced cannot properly deal with structural bias”).
131. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 850–51 (warning that
these parables are weakened if not properly retold).
132. See generally id. (analyzing corporate law through the lens of Christian
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Rauschenbusch provides some support for the ability of
moral suasion to persuade managers to behave in ethical ways
that puts the interests of their companies over their own selfish
interests.133 That support is far from total, given the structural
reality of capitalist corporations. Rauschenbusch was quite
critical of the corporate management of his time.134 “Corporate
management,” Rauschenbusch notes, “eliminates personal
sympathy and the individual sense of honor to a degree which
many of us hardly understand. The moral code of the business
man is largely shaped for him by the moral code of his class.”135
But Rauschenbusch did think there was hope that a
movement of moral regeneration could persuade corporate
managers to act differently.136 They could repent and convert. He
argues that “[t]he fundamental step of repentance and conversion
for professions and organizations is to give up monopoly power
and the incomes derived from legalized extortion, and to come
under the law of service, content with a fair income for honest
work.”137 This can of course happen individually, manager by
manager, but Rauschenbusch hoped for a broader movement.
In the last resort the only hope is in the moral forces which
can be summoned to the rescue. If there are statesmen,
prophets, and apostles who set truth and justice above selfish
advancement; if their call finds a response in the great body of
the people; if a new tide of religious faith and moral
enthusiasm creates new standards of duty and a new capacity
for self-sacrifice; if the strong learn to direct their love of
power to the uplifting of the people and see the highest
self-assertion in self-sacrifice—then the intrenchments of
vested wrong will melt away; the stifled energy of the people
will leap forward . . . .138

norms and comparing judicial opinions to “sermons”).
133. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 313 (observing
that enlightened businessmen see self-serving policies as immoral and
shameful).
134. See id. (arguing against the notion that “unfettered operation of
self-love” benefits all).
135. Id. at 360.
136. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 117 (suggesting
that salvation was possibly by “coming under the law of Christ”).
137. Id.
138. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 285.
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But Rauschenbusch was far from convinced that such a
moral regenerative movement was likely within the structural
confines of the capitalist corporation.139 Greed is a powerful force,
and the shareholder-owned corporation puts the focus on the
interests of the capitalist class that provides money. Corporate
managers in this structure are likely to reflect the interests and
mentality of that class.140 Rauschenbusch thus focused much of
his attention on alternatives outside the shareholder-owned
corporation, including worker cooperatives and state ownership.
If a man wants to lead and direct, he can not do it by money
power; he must do it by character, sobriety and good
judgment . . . . Consequently the co-operatives develop men
and educate a community in helpful loyalty and comradeship.
This is the advent of true democracy in economic life.141

Thus, Rauschenbusch straddles the communitarian and the
regulatory wings of progressive thought.
Novak has a more optimistic view of managers in the
corporations of his time.142 He does think that a significant
amount of egoistic self-interest exists, and follows the
contractarians in arguing that corporations, and the capitalist
economy generally, work well in good part because they
effectively harness that selfishness.143
Any social order that intends to endure must be based on a
certain realism about human beings and, therefore, on a
theory of sin and a praxis for dealing with it. However sin is
defined, its energies must be given shape, since sinful energies
overlooked in theory are certain to find outlets in practice.
Thus some hypothesize that democratic capitalism is based on
self-interest, greed, acquisitiveness, [and] egotism. 144
139. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 111 (claiming
that capitalism tends to promote private profit and materialism over public
service).
140. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07
(discussing the two-class system of modern capitalism).
141. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 112.
142. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 132–33 (highlighting cooperation
among corporate managers). Novak’s time is decades later than that of
Rauschenbusch. This may help explain some of the differences between them.
143. See id. at 113–15 (adopting Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory to
describe the order behind choices motivated by self-interest).
144. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 28.
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Novak frequently cites Adam Smith on this insight.
But Novak also thinks that self-ordering within capitalist
corporations will in many important ways develop an ethic of
cooperation.145 On this point, his argument fits within but notably
expands upon the analysis of corporate law contractarians.146 He
frequently stresses how commerce, especially within corporations,
is fundamentally cooperative, and persons involved in commerce
will naturally develop norms of cooperation.147
The ethic of commerce furnishes a school of virtue favorable to
democratic governance. This ethic is not pretentious in its
conception of reason and human nature. It enhances the
cooperative spirit, since economic tasks cannot be
accomplished by one person alone. It increases attention to
law. It singles out the self-determination of the individual as
the main source of social energy. It places limits on the state
and other authorities. It incites imagination and industry. It
disciplines all to common sense.148

This cooperative spirit shines through particularly when
working in businesses.
Operating from rational self-interest, defined as each
participant chooses through faith, reason and virtue to define
it, many participants seek satisfactions from their work that
are far from monetary, selfish, or materialistic. The social
order is much enhanced by such choices. Philanthropy, the
arts, education, research, and many other altruistic activities
are expected to flower and do in fact flower under democratic
capitalism.149

“For many millions of religious persons,” Novak explains, “the
daily milieu in which they work out their salvation is the
145. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 133 (likening corporations to
communities with similar social cohesion).
146. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 856, 871–73 (1997) (book review) (citing Novak as agreeing that the pure
selfishness posited by much economic argument is an abstraction, and that real
people are more complex).
147. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 116–22 (arguing that commerce
ultimately unites societies, as profit is often contingent upon mutual
satisfaction).
148. Id. at 117–18.
149. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 11.
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communal, corporate world of the workplace. For many, the
workplace is a kind of second family. Even those who hate their
work often like their co-workers.”150
This spirit of cooperation, according to Novak, does not
appear simply among lower level workers.151 It is critical for most
successful corporate managers too.152 After all, managers must
manage people. To do so, they must understand those people and
find ways to get them to work together effectively for the
interests of the cooperation. That involves both carrots and sticks,
but carrots often work better. For example, “suppose that some
autocrats still function in various spheres of authority today,
including business. What sanctions are available to autocrats
within a corporation? Leadership in all spheres today seems to
depend upon large areas of consensus; leaders seem to ‘manage’
more than they ‘command.’”153
It is a much more optimistic vision of corporations, and of the
role of managers within corporations, than we see in
Rauschenbusch.154 There may be some role for state regulation to
deter managerial abuse; however, Novak believes that both
instrumental and moral mechanisms that corporations develop
within themselves will for the most part work well to encourage
managers to focus on the needs of their shareholders and
employees.155
Niebuhr provides more pessimistic insights. He is less
inclined to think that either moral suasion by the courts or
preachers or internally-generated norms of cooperation that flow
from working with others are likely to tame the rapacious
interests of corporate managers.156 He does not deny some role for
150. Id. at 41.
151. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 132 (pointing to some amount of
association at each level of a corporation’s structure).
152. See id. at 132–33 (remarking on the cooperative spirit of corporate
managers).
153. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 43.
154. Compare NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 79 (agreeing with Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand” theory), with RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra
note 24, at 370–71 (refuting the idea that success depends on commercialism
rather than a focus on societal values).
155. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 79 (“[M]arkets as free as possible
from governmental and religious command best serve the common good.”).
156. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 234 (“[H]uman society will probably
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self-restraint, but he thinks that role is inevitably limited.157
Niebuhr explains that “it will always be necessary to rely partly
upon the honesty and self-restraint of those who are not socially
restrained. But here again, it will never be possible to insure
moral antidotes sufficiently potent to destroy the deleterious
effects of the poison of power upon character.”158
That reference to the “poison of power” flows from a central
insight of Niebuhr’s philosophy. The sin of self-centeredness and
pride lies deep in human character.159 Even where we try to
break free of it by acting with and for others, the pull of pride is
deep.160 We give ourselves too much credit for acting morally and
selflessly than we really deserve.161 And that is even truer for the
powerful.162 They have done well in the world, and are inclined to
think their success flows from their natural merit.163 They are
surrounded by peers who share that belief and by subordinates
who toady and dare not express doubts about the innate virtue of
men with the power to fire them.164 “Capitalists,” according to
Niebuhr, “are not greater sinners than poor labourers by any
natural depravity. But it is a fact that those who hold great
economic and political power are more guilty of pride against God

never escape social conflict, even though it extends the areas of social
co-operation.”).
157. See id. at 21 (advocating for a combination of social strategies in order
to advance society).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 60 (discussing the difficulty of judging self-interest, as it
hides behind hidden motives and may not be externally observable).
160. See id. at 47 (suggesting that even a man acting in the best interest of
family may be self-aggrandizing by projecting his own success as a husband and
father).
161. See id. at 45 (arguing that “there is no miracle by which men can
achieve a rationality high enough” to eliminate self-interest).
162. See id. at 8 (noting that while men with power and wealth attempt to
justify social inequality, “it is impossible to justify the degree of inequality
which complex societies inevitably create”).
163. See id. (“If superior abilities and services to society deserve special
rewards it may be regarded as axiomatic that the rewards are always higher
than the services warrant.”).
164. See NIEBUHR, NATURE, supra note 106, at 225 (“[S]ocio-economic
conditions actually determine to a large degree that some men are tempted to
pride and injustice, while others are encouraged to humility.”).
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and of injustice against the weak than those who lack power and
prestige.”165
One place where one sees this misplaced confidence in one’s
own merit and virtue is in executive compensation.166 Boards set
the compensation of top managers, but boards consist of other top
managers.167 Of course their high pay reflects the great
contributions they make to the success of the business.168 Niebuhr
is skeptical. Some incentive pay is needed to motivate managers,
but almost certainly less than we actually observe.169 The rich
and powerful must justify their pay to themselves and others,
and they get creative.170 Niebuhr explains that “since inequalities
of privilege are greater than could possibly be defended
rationally, the intelligence of privileged groups is usually applied
to the task of inventing specious proofs for the theory that
universal values spring from, and that general interests are
served by, the special privileges which they hold.”171
Niebuhr’s insights on the propensity of the powerful to see
their powers and privileges as naturally ordained and justified is
closely related to a point about corporate governance that Claire
Hill and I have called a “pernicious golden rule.”172 Outside
directors closely identify with the interests of the officers they are
supposed to monitor, and they make decisions for those they
monitor that they would hope those who are in turn monitoring
them would make in their own corporations.173
165. Id.
166. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 130, at 335 (“[D]irectors may simply
see the world from the same vantage point as the officers do, a vantage point
from which the executive compensation packages we have seen are reasonable
and appropriate.”).
167. See id. at 366–67 (noting that executives largely set compensation, and
boards made of like-minded executives likely will not change this trend).
168. See id. at 367 (pointing to an “efficiency-based justification”).
169. See id. at 369 (discussing the difficulty of measuring appropriate
compensation).
170. See NIEBUHR, supra note 26, at 8 (“Most rational and social
justifications of unequal privilege are clearly afterthoughts.”).
171. Id. at 117.
172. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 838 (2007).
173. See id. (“The outside directors may thus make decisions that favor
those officers and themselves even if doing so is not the best course for the
corporation as a whole.”).
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Thus, for Niebuhr, power and hierarchy poison relations
much more than the cooperative vision we see in Novak, and the
chances of moral suasion removing that poison are less than
possibly Rauschenbusch, and certainly Johnson, suggest.174 Does
that mean more intrusive state regulation is needed? Possibly,
but as we have already noted and will discuss in more detail
later, Niebuhr is also skeptical about that.
B. Corporate Purpose
An ongoing debate in corporate law, dating back at least to
the Berle-Dodd dialogue of the early thirties, concerns the proper
purpose that corporations are expected to pursue.175 The previous
subpart concerned how to ensure that officers and directors
pursue the corporation’s interests rather than their own, but
what are the corporation’s interests? Contractarians believe the
proper purpose is to maximize shareholder value, while
communitarians think the proper purpose balances the interests
of various stakeholders, including employees, creditors, the local
community, and the environment in addition to stakeholders.176
Lyman
Johnson
has
argued
for
the
communitarian/stakeholder position in a series of papers.177 His
174. Compare NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 21 (discussing the
“poison of power” and the difficulty of abolishing injustice), with NOVAK, SPIRIT,
supra note 17, at 129–34 (arguing that the social hierarchy within corporations
leads to greater cooperation), and RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note
24, at 110–17 (suggesting that corporations may find redemption by converting
to Christian values).
175. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
(Andrew Gold & Gordon Smith, eds.) (forthcoming 2017); Lyman Johnson, Law
and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 974, 975 (2013) (focusing on the emergence of the benefit
corporation); Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 1, at 405 (recommending a
pluralistic approach to corporate purpose, accounting for both public and
shareholder benefit); Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate
Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 975 (2002) (discussing how to
“reconcile the interests of the individual with those of the group”).
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religious perspective plays an important role in grounding his
arguments for that position.178 Communitarians want
corporations to pursue the public good and, in many cases,
religious faith inspires corporate leaders to do just that.179
What do the thoughts of our three religious thinkers have to
say about corporate purpose? Rauschenbusch certainly endorses
the communitarian vision of corporate purpose.180 He is highly
critical of the corporations of his time on this point. He asserts,
“Our industrial establishments are institutions for the creation of
dividends, and not for the fostering of human life. In all our
public life the question of profit is put first.”181 He believes this
focus on profit goes against the proper purpose of corporations.182
According to Rauschenbusch, “[o]ur public-service corporations
exist for the public, but we know how these our servants have
become our masters, so that the public exists for their
dividends.”183 Note the phrase “public-service corporations.”184
Rauschenbusch frequently uses it, and it embodies his vision of
proper corporate purpose.185
Expanding on this point a bit further, he says:
Our public service corporations exist because the community
grants them the use of public property and exercises the
sovereign right of eminent domain on their behalf. They are
stewards of public property and powers. But we have all seen
in recent years that they have been very close to forgetting
that they are stewards and have acted as if they were the
owners.186

178. See Johnson, Counter-Narrative, supra note 1, at 853 (drawing parallels
between corporate law and the biblical narrative).
179. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 102 (“[F]or many business people such
other-regarding behavior flows from religious faith.”).
180. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 370 (disagreeing
with the contention that profit-seeking should come before health and
happiness).
181. Id. at 370.
182. See id. (arguing that instead of asking how people may boost corporate
profits, people should ask how corporations may improve society).
183. Id. at 186.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 385 (providing an explanation of why these are
“public-service” corporations).
186. Id.
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The notion of stewardship is critical for Rauschenbusch.
Corporations may be private entities, but they are enabled by the
state in order to further a public purpose, and corporate leaders
should always remember that and make the public good the
objective that they are always pursuing.187
As we have seen, though, Rauschenbusch is far from
convinced that simply positing this corporate purpose and linking
the duty of corporate directors and officers to it will be enough to
guarantee that those managers do indeed generally pursue the
public good.188 Sometimes he does call for a moral regeneration
which will inspire managers to pursue the public good.189 But
sometimes he calls for more structural changes that will cause
corporations to focus on their proper purpose.190 As noted above,
he called for worker cooperatives and state ownership as other
solutions to the problem of an excessive focus on profit.191
Novak, by contrast, appears to think that the fiduciary duty
of corporate directors and officers does run to shareholders.192
And he seems to agree with Friedman and Smith that this will,
through the magic of the market, tend to lead to socially
beneficial results.193 However, Novak also stresses another point
frequently made by contractarians, namely, that the long-run
profitability of a corporation is typically enhanced by responding

187. See id. (noting that rate regulations are a way for the public to remind
corporations that the public retains control).
188. See id. at 382 (recognizing that as society becomes more complex,
corporate “trustees” may be more tempted to succumb to self-interest).
189. See id. at 220 (calling for social regeneration “if our Christian
civilization is to stand and advance”).
190. See id. at 401 (analogizing the working class to army that must become
organized to fight for its cause).
191. See supra Part III.A (describing Rauschenbusch’s calls for
reorganization).
192. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (arguing that firms owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders). For an extended analysis of why that might
indeed be socially beneficial, written by a Catholic corporate law scholar who
shares much of Novak’s vision of the spirit of democratic capitalism, see
Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 858 (proposing “a conservative variant on the
basic contractarian model”).
193. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (suggesting that market forces
will tend to weed out greedy corporate actors while rewarding those with
integrity).
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to the needs and concerns of other corporate stakeholders.194
Thus, in practice the shareholder and stakeholder visions are
really not that different in what they imply for actual behavior.195
Novak says:
Apart from internal restraints, the system itself places
restraints upon greed and narrowly construed self-interest.
Greed and selfishness, when they occur, are made to have
their costs. A firm aware of its long-term fiduciary
responsibilities to its shareholders must protect its
investments for future generations. It must change with the
times. It must maintain a reputation for reliability, integrity,
and fairness.196

Elaborating further on this point, Novak argues:
[T]here is a difference between maximization of profit and
optimization of profit. To aim at maximizing profit—that is, to
obtain the greatest profit possible out of every opportunity—is
to be greedy in the present at the expense of the future. The
profit maximizer demands too much for products that can be
produced more cheaply by somebody else and in the process
narrows his market and destroys his reputation. Inevitably, he
damages himself and, in time, destroys himself . . . . By
contrast, to optimize profit is to take many other factors
besides profit into account, including long-term new
investment, consumer loyalty, and the sense of a fair service
for a fair price.197

Thus, Novak again thinks that the social nature of the
corporation will tend to smooth out conflicts and problems.198
Corporate managers must work with and anticipate the needs of
194. See id. (noting that greedy behavior will affect not only shareholders,
but customers, employees, competitors, and the public). I discuss the literature
on long-versus short-run profit and its relationship to the proper purpose of
corporations in Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short and Long-Term
Investors (and Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill &
Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
195. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (observing that limiting selfinterested behavior would improve corporations and personal life).
196. Id. at 1554.
197. NOVAK, THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 45–46.
198. See id. at 50 (“While corporations spring from some of our most
cherished ideals about liberty, initiative, investment in the future, cooperation,
and the like, they must also be judged in light of our ideals.”).
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many different groups, and good managers will work to pursue
the interests of those different groups as a way of advancing the
interests of their businesses and themselves. In contrast, Novak
thinks that the democratic promise of cooperatives, cited
approvingly by Rauschenbusch, looks beguiling but in fact is not
a good idea:
To organize industry democratically would be a grave and
costly error, since democratic procedures are not designed for
productivity and efficiency. Poor management may not
recognize that workmen on the line are fertile in figuring out
new and better ways of doing things; but good management
does. The more a corporation embodies the principle of
subsidiarity in its organization, the closer to its work force it
becomes.199

Again, Steve Bainbridge provides a more extended economic
defense of this claim.200
Niebuhr once again throws some cold water on both
positions. He is skeptical about how broadly corporate leaders can
cast their sympathies.201 Can they really, honestly commit
themselves to a broad pursuit of the public good? They may think
they can and do, but as usual Niebuhr suspects that most will
have an underlying partial and self-centered picture of the world
that is less noble than they believe themselves to be.202 They
flatter themselves, as do those around them, but when push
comes to shove, they care most about the bottom line of their own
well-being.
The man of power, though humane impulse may awaken in
him, always remains something of the beast of prey . . . . His
philanthropy is a perfect illustration of the curious compound
of the brutal and the moral which we find in all human
behavior; for his generosity is at once a display of his power
and an expression of his pity. His generous impulses freeze
199. NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 178–79.
200. See Bainbridge, supra note 146, at 878 (“The theory seems to hold that
having a say in corporate decisionmaking leads workers to view their efforts as
part of a collaborative undertaking, rather than as just a job.”).
201. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 23, at 14–15 (arguing that with
the “increased centralization of economic power” economic power “has become
the significant coercive force of modern society”).
202. See id. (“The moral attitudes of dominant and privileged groups are
characterized by universal self-deception and hypocrisy.”).
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within him if his power is challenged or his generosities are
accepted without grateful humility. 203

So much for the hope of an ethic of stewardship.
It is more plausible to believe that corporate directors and
officers can indeed become firmly devoted to the interests of
shareholders. Modern compensation ties their own pecuniary
self-interest firmly to share price. Moreover, a focus on just
shareholders involves less complexity and imaginative projection,
and most shareholders belong to the same class as managers,
with shared identities and values. So perhaps then the link
between long term shareholder value and helping other
stakeholders, emphasized by Novak and others, will cause
managers to behave in a way that advances the public good, at
least much of the time.
But there too Niebuhr has an argument that casts serious
doubt. Imagine a corporate manager genuinely committed to
shareholder value maximization, facing a decision between
making a healthy profit now versus foregoing that profit now to
do something that has a good chance of bringing much more
profit in the future, but where the link to the future is quite
uncertain. Perhaps if the manager were the sole shareholder,
acting on her own behalf, she would believe the risk is worth it.
But will she think that if she is acting on behalf of a large
number of shareholders? Niebuhr suggests no. He argues that
“[a]n individual may sacrifice his own interests, either without
hope of reward or in the hope of an ultimate compensation. But
how is an individual, who is responsible for the interests of his
group, to justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own?”204
This suggests that an ethic of shareholder value
maximization may cause managers to do things that do not in
fact really best promote shareholder interests in the long run,
because the long run effects are hard to quantify, squishy, and
uncertain.205 A genuine sense of responsibility makes them loath
to take that risk, even where they would do so acting for
themselves, and even where the shareholders themselves, if
203. Id. at 13–14.
204. Id. at 267.
205. See id. (“But how is an individual, who is responsible for the interests of
his group, to justify the sacrifice of interests other than his own?”).
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surveyed, might think the risk is worth taking.206 I suspect that a
dynamic like this is an important element in understanding the
effects of the growing dominance of the shareholder value norm
in recent decades.
As with Niebuhr on duty, so too here with Niebuhr on
purpose; perhaps the conclusion is that promoting more pro-social
behavior by corporate managers is not the solution, and that
greater state regulation is needed. If we cannot trust corporations
to pursue the social good on their own where that good goes
against the dictates of profit (and sometimes even when the
public good and the dictates of profit are consistent, but only in
an overly indeterminate future), then maybe we need to legally
require corporations to act better through various specific laws
addressing specific sources of social harm that businesses cause.
We turn to that question next, and we shall see that Niebuhr is
also skeptical about this answer.
V. Regulation and Pluralism
The previous Part focused on the implications of the thought
of our three religious thinkers for internal regulation by and of
corporations—essentially, how to think about motivating the
behavior of corporate directors and officers. We now turn to the
implications of their thought for questions of external regulation
and pluralism. How much need there is for external regulation
depends in part upon how well you think corporations will be
internally motivated to care about the effects they have upon
various internal and external stakeholders, which we have just
explored. It also depends upon how severe you think the potential
effects of corporate harms are, and upon how well you think state
actors will be able to formulate and enforce effective rules.
A. The Promise and Peril of Regulation
As we have seen, Rauschenbusch is ambivalent about the
ability of capitalist corporations, and those who run them, to
reform themselves and serve the public interest as they are
206.

Id.
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meant to.207 He holds out some hope of a moral movement that
transforms the vision of corporate leaders.208 But he was skeptical
about the prospects.209 Managers and shareholders made huge
profits under the existing system; getting them to forego a
significant chunk of those profits is hard to do.
Rauschenbusch hoped to persuade corporate managers to
change, but contemplated other strategies if they refused:
The present movement for federal and state interference and
control over corporations . . . is an effort reassert the
ownership and mastership of the people and to force these
stewards of public powers back into the position of public
servants. The next decade will probably show whether they
are willing to take the position of well-paid servants and cease
from ousting the owner. If not, the people will have to say,
“Render the account of thy stewardship, for thou canst no
longer be steward.”210

Rauschenbusch advocated a variety of alternative strategies.
We have already seen that he championed worker cooperatives
and labor unions.211 He also advocated direct socialism, including
state ownership of at least some leading corporations, and
regulation of others.212 He thought that democratic politics
inspired by spiritual ideals had great promise. According to
Rauschenbusch, “[i]f men conceive of political duties as a high
religious service to man and God, the State can be a powerful

207. See generally RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24; see also
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 113 (“Whenever capitalism
has invaded a new country or industry, there has been a speeding up in labor
and in the production of wealth, but always with a trail of human misery,
discontent, bitterness, and demoralization.”).
208. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386 (arguing that
state and federal interference with corporations may force corporate leaders to
become more conscientious and serve the public); see also id. at 285 (hoping for a
broader movement of “religious faith” and “moral enthusiasm”).
209. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72, at 111 (claiming
that the structure of capitalism limits the desire for individuals to engage in
public service).
210. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386.
211. Id. at 400–11 (advocating for the benefits of a working class movement,
as well as a movement to promote cooperation between workers and owners).
212. Id. at 406–07 (advocating for a workers’ movement and lamenting the
continuing struggle of the working class to gain advancement).
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agent in the bettering of human life.”213 Additionally, he argues
that “[t]he social body needs moral innervation; and the spread of
men who combine religious faith, moral enthusiasm, and
economic information, and apply the combined result to public
morality, promises to create a moral sensitiveness never yet
known.”214 Rauschenbusch is of course aware of the difficulty of
overcoming the political power of the dominant capitalist class.215
However, he has faith that a democratic movement can
succeed.216
And he asks no questions about possible abuses if such a
movement did succeed. In part this reflects the time period in
which Rauschenbusch wrote. Christianity and the Social Crisis217
appeared before World War I, and A Theology for the Social
Gospel218 appeared as that war ended. Thus, the world had not
yet experienced communism in power in the Soviet Union and
elsewhere, nor had the United States yet experienced the full
welfare and regulatory state that would be put in place under the
New Deal.219 Our other two writers had that additional
experience, and it affected their thinking about politics
significantly.
As we have seen, Novak is much more sanguine about
corporations than Rauschenbusch. He believes that both the
market system and the internal logic of cooperation will cause
corporations to mostly pursue the public good quite effectively.220

213. Id. at 183.
214. Id. at 357.
215. See id. at 186 (“In so far as [the Church] is loyalty to [things as they
ought to be], it must be in perpetual but friendly conflict with the State . . . .”).
216. See id. at 286 (“It will depend almost wholly on the moral forces which
the Christian nations can bring to the fighting line against wrong, and the
fighting energy of those moral forces will again depend on the degree to which
they are inspired by religious faith and enthusiasm.”).
217. Id.
218. RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL GOSPEL, supra note 72.
219. See John Braithwaite, The Regulatory State?, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POL. INSTS. 219–20 (2011) (describing the rise of the regulatory state).
220. See NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (noting that individuals are
often influenced by community, family, and sympathy in addition to their own
self interest, and arguing that corporate management will act in accordance
with those values to draw the best out of their employees).
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There will still be some need to regulate to protect the public, but
the need is quite limited.221
In some areas, no doubt, the political system will wish to have
its say in economic affairs. Smith gave many examples in
which he judged such political intervention useful and
commendable. There can be no doubt, however, about the main
thrust of Smith’s argument: that markets as free as possible
from governmental and religious command best serve the
common good. Such a system frees the intelligence,
imagination, and enterprise of individuals to explore the
possibilities inherent in world process . . . .222

Beyond thinking that state intervention is mostly not
needed, Novak also thinks that state power is quite dangerous,
and needs to be limited.223 His key works were written in the
seventies and eighties.224 The Soviet Union still loomed large, and
the deregulation of the Reagan years was just beginning. Novak
worried greatly about tyranny if state power was unchecked.225 In
describing the spirit of democratic capitalism, Novak conceived of
it as a system with three major components: political, economic,
and cultural.226 Each exercises a great deal of power, and each
helps check the other two.227 This pluralistic system prevents any
one of the three components from becoming too powerful.
This differentiation of systems sets individuals possessed of
the will-to-power on three separate tracks. Political activists
may compete for eminence in the political system, economic
activists in the economic system, religious activists and
intellectual in various parts of the moral-cultural system. But
the powers of each of the three systems over the others, while
in each case substantial, are firmly limited. It is not likely that
221. See id. at 80 (determining that self interest alone may not be sufficient
to prevent corporations from imposing harm on others).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 231–32.
224. For example, Novak’s Democratic Capitalism, id., was written in 1982.
225. See id. at 79 (illustrating that a market system free from governmental
commands liberates intelligence and imagination, allowing individuals to
explore possibilities of interest).
226. See id. at 172–86 (discussing the presence of three different systems—
economic, political, and cultural—as the driving forces behind democratic
capitalism).
227. See id. at 185 (illustrating the tension between the cultural system and
the political and economic systems).
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one person or party can gain complete dominance over all
three systems, and should such misfortune come to pass, there
remain plural roads by which offended forces may attack each
pretender at his weakest points.228

Thus, socialist ownership of large businesses or extensive
regulation by powerful administrative agencies risks both
squashing the innovative energy of private enterprise while
giving too much power to politicians and bureaucrats.
We have seen that Niebuhr is more skeptical than Novak, or
even Rauschenbusch, that shareholder-owned corporations
generally pursue the public interest, or that their leaders can be
persuaded to do so by a moral reform movement.229 Does he then
turn to either socialist ownership or extensive state regulation as
a way to stop corporations from harming the public? He was a
political liberal during the New Deal and post-World War II era,
so he did advocate more state intervention than Novak prefers.230
However, Niebuhr shared Novak’s concerns about the threat of
concentrated political power.231 He found socialists like
Rauschenbusch naïve about what would happen after the state
took over business enterprises.
They seem to believe that it will be easy to create perfect social
mutuality by destroying inequality of power. But can they
destroy economic power without creating strong centres of
political power? And how may they be certain that this
political power will be either ethically or politically restrained?
We have seen that it is difficult to prevent the centralization of
economic power without giving the political state tremendous
authority. A powerful state necessitates dangerous
concentrations of political power in the hands of a few
individuals and a small group. There is no certainty that this

228. Id. at 56.
229. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing Niebur’s theory
on the morality of man and his capability to act for the benefit of the public
interest).
230. Compare NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26 (advocating for more
state state intervention), with NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17 (advocating for
restraint on the part of the State).
231. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192 (arguing that
concentrated political power may be overbearing on the populace). See generally
NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17.

1082

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (2017)

new power can be brought under either perfect ethical or social
restraint.232

Niebuhr’s deep distrust of both economic and political power
flows from his core vision of the immense difficulty of rising above
our inherent self-centered nature.233 When we do try to do so in
collective organizations, those organizations themselves become
overly focused on their group interests, and their leaders are
filled with pride. That is as true for socialist politicians as it is for
capitalist managers.
That leaves Niebuhr with a tough balancing act, and more
pessimism about the likely outcomes of collective action through
either economic or political organizations. He does, like
Rauschenbusch, support cooperatives and labor unions as a form
of power to counterbalance corporations without posing as much
of a threat as a large state power.234 Of course, the union and
cooperative movements looked more promising in the
mid-twentieth century than they do today. But perhaps this
provides some insight in thinking about the new social enterprise
movement. To date, legal reforms like the low-profit LLC and the
benefit corporation have focused mainly on purpose and duty as
ways to help encourage enterprises to pursue the public good
along with profit.235 Perhaps more attention should be focused on
issues of ownership, voting, and representation.236 If we want
businesses to reflect the interests of employees, customers, local
communities, and the environment, giving those stakeholders a
232. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192.
233. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (outlining Niebuhr’s concerns
about the selfishness of human nature).
234. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at xi (arguing that social
competition can create immorality among even moral individuals); see also
RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 400–11 (advocating for the
benefits of a working class movement, as well as a movement to promote
cooperation between workers and owners).
235. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form
of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 597 (2011) (citing that benefit
corporation statutes are created for the purpose of allowing entities to pursue
the general public benefit).
236. See generally Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Public
Markets: First Experiments and Next Steps, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263 (2016);
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity
Through
Public
Benefit
Corporations,
GEO.
LAW
(2016),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1783.
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more direct say over decisions, or who makes decisions, may
make sense, if we cannot trust corporate leaders to adequately
internalize the interests of others.
B. Pluralism and Religious Accommodation
In a world in which regulations have proliferated to address
a wide variety of harms that business enterprises impose, the
possibility of businesses pursuing the public good according to
their own understandings but nonetheless running into conflicts
with some regulations becomes increasingly common. Both
government and enterprises pursue many different public goods,
with varying and sometimes conflicting value systems by which
they evaluate those goods. When, if ever, should regulations give
way to allow private organizations to pursue their own versions of
the good in ways that might conflict with those regulations?
This question has recently become a highly visible
controversy for corporations with a religiously-grounded purpose
following the Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.237 In that case, a provision of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act required employers to provide insurance
coverage for their employees that included providing for
contraception.238 The plaintiff companies were for-profit
corporations owned by families with strong religious beliefs
opposing certain forms of contraception that can function as
abortifacients.239 The companies sued, invoking the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to argue that this provision
substantially burdened their free exercise of religion.240 The
Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that under some

237. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (illustrating a clash between the ideals of a government regulation
mandating certain health-care related packages, and the private corporation’s
ideals).
238. Id. at 2754.
239. Id. at 2755; see also Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby
Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 783–87 (2015) (outlining the legal and factual
background of the Hobby Lobby case).
240. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754.
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conditions for-profit business corporations can be persons with
standing to claim the protections of RFRA.241
What would our three religious thinkers say about Hobby
Lobby? Novak’s opinion would seem the easiest to guess.242 Novak
puts great stress on the importance of pluralism. His pluralism in
part rests on a healthy respect for diverse beliefs, and the value
of giving much legal and social space for persons and
organizations to both express and act upon their individual and
collective beliefs.243 His pluralism also rests upon a suspicion of
letting the government have too much power.244 Both grounds
suggest that Novak would welcome the majority opinion in Hobby
Lobby.245
What would Rauschenbusch say about Hobby Lobby? I am
less
sure
about
him.
One
variant
of
the
communitarian/progressive approach sees corporations as a
strong source for achieving the public good, in many instances as
a preferred substitute to regulation.246 Publicly-oriented
corporations are preferred to regulation in part because of a
recognition of the existence and validity of plural notions of the
public good. Lyman Johnson (writing with David Millon) has
made that argument in support of the Hobby Lobby decision.247
241. Id. at 2773.
242. As Novak died very recently, presumably he in fact had an opinion on
the Hobby Lobby case itself, unlike Rauschenbusch and Niebuhr (well, I suppose
I am making assumptions about the consequences of death that perhaps I
should not be making in a paper on the theology of the corporation). I have been
unable to find a public expression by Novak on the case, however.
243. I find the following quote a quite elegant statement of a religious
argument for the value of respecting diverse beliefs. “Aquinas once wrote that
humans are made in the image of God but that since God is infinite He may be
mirrored only through a virtually infinite number of humans. No concept of Him
is adequate.” NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 53.
244. See id. at 56 (arguing that the division of power between the economic,
cultural, and governmental system adequately distributes power between the
three so one system does not overpower the others).
245. Although, insofar as Novak supports the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, that could conceivably push him in the opposite direction.
See McDonnell, supra note 239, at 790 (illustrating that for-profit corporations
are only allowed one purpose, to maximize returns for shareholders).
246. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 402 (arguing that
promoting cooperation between classes and movement toward social gain can be
done voluntarily through corporations, rather than through regulation).
247. See generally David Millon & Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law After
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But a different version of the progressive vision puts more
emphasis on regulation and state action as a way to achieve the
public good. This version is more skeptical of attempts by
individual corporations to get out of generally applicable
regulation. Many progressive corporate law scholars fall within
this camp and oppose the Hobby Lobby decision.248 Would
Rauschenbusch side with Johnson and Millon or with the many
progressive law scholars on the other side of the opinion? I am
not at all sure, although I suspect his sympathies might lie more
with the employees potentially denied access to contraceptive
care rather than with the shareholders wanting to deny that
access.249
And what of Niebuhr? There again I am unsure. Might he
say a pox on both your houses, unhappy with both the wealthy
shareholder families trying to impose their values on the health
plans of their employees and also with the politicians and
government bureaucrats trying to score political points on a
deeply sensitive moral dilemma? Might he see this as yet another
example where the egoism of groups clashing in politics creates
conflict with no good and fair resolution? If so, he would certainly
have a point.
Personally, I side with Novak and Johnson on this one.
RFRA is an important statement of the value of religious liberty
and diversity of belief and action. In a world of extensive
regulation covering most elements of business and commerce,
RFRA provides a safety valve protecting religiously-motivated
behavior that goes against prevailing moral norms. It expresses
humility about our ability to craft wise rules in a complex world
with competing, sometimes irreconcilable visions of the right and
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2015).
248. This includes many, probably most, of the scholars who signed the Brief
for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos.
13-345, 13-356), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/13-354-13-356_amcu_cclp.authcheckdam.pdf.
249. See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Who Controls Corporate Culture?,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 16, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/
news/opinion/columns/who-controls-corporate-culture/article_5dbb9b4c-8c6e-500e9c3f-2a2a4abe18c3.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2017) (offering a powerful
articulation of this perspective) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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the good. The Hobby Lobby case extends that protection of
religious exercise to business corporations, thereby recognizing
that corporations can be not simply profit-making machines, but
rather organizations devoted to various ideals of the good and
human flourishing.250
VI. Conclusion
We don’t necessarily need to choose. Rauschenbusch, Novak,
and Niebuhr all provide many insights of much value. We can
learn from each of them. And there is significant overlap in their
visions of individuals and society. All understand that human
beings have a fundamental self-centeredness that we can struggle
to overcome, individually and within groups, but most of us will
never fully succeed. Social institutions like the corporation must
take this egoism into account, while also helping to develop the
more social elements of our nature. Through both the invisible
hand of the market and through both enlightened long-run
self-interest and some other-regarding norms, corporations will
often act in ways that benefit the public as well as their
managers and their shareholders. But sometimes they will not,
and for at least some matters state regulation will be needed to
limit corporate harms. Of course, our three figures differ
frequently in how much they emphasize these different points,
and in the balance of policy choices they advocate.251
Where they differ, some of their differences may be due to
when they lived and wrote. Rauschenbusch wrote during the
height of the initial burst of industrialization in the early
twentieth century, when society faced many problems, and
250. See McDonnell, supra note 239, at 809 (arguing that progressive
corporate law envisions corporations as “ways for like-minded persons to come
together to pursue shared goals to advance a shared vision of the common good
in ways to go beyond simply complying with the law”).
251. Compare RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 386
(arguing that state and federal interference with corporations may force
corporate leaders to become more conscientious and serve the public), with
NOVAK, SPIRIT, supra note 17, at 93 (reasoning that market forces will weed out
greedy corporate actors, and that as a result governmental regulation may not
be effective), and NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 192 (balancing a
distrust for centralized power and collective action, with a desire to encourage
cooperative movements).
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regulation to address those problems was just beginning to be
enacted. The world as yet had no experience with communism in
power. Rauschenbusch advocated vigorous action to address
problems caused by new markets and large corporations, and did
not dwell on potential downsides to his proposed solutions.
Niebuhr wrote starting at the beginning of the New Deal,
continuing through World War II and the post-war era.
Originally a socialist, he gradually came to support the New Deal,
in part as it showed success, in part as fascism became a
dominant threat, and in part in response to the failures of
communism. Novak wrote his major work in the eighties. The
failures of communism were impossible to ignore, and the highly
regulated welfare state was struggling, with political and
intellectual energy lying with pro-market reformers.
Which of them has the most to add to thinking about duty
and purpose in corporate law today? As we have seen repeatedly,
Rauschenbusch and Novak, for the most part, fit comfortably
within the communitarian and contractualist approaches,
respectively, although each has distinctive insights they bring to
bear within those visions.252 In our time, the pendulum has
swung from the deregulation trend of the eighties, and economic
inequality has become a threat closer to what it was in the early
twentieth century than it has been since World War II ended. All
that may make Novak’s analysis somewhat dated. And yet,
neither the socialism nor the worker cooperatives and labor union
activism that Rauschenbusch championed seem politically viable
major options in our moment.
Does Niebuhr present an alternative? He certainly had a
more unique perspective that does not fit as easily within existing
approaches to corporate law. His realism that can be somewhat
hard to distinguish from pessimism seems on point in our time.
Contractualism and communitarianism, director primacy and
shareholder primacy, managerialism and shareholder activism—
all have grown intellectually stale, all have serious problems,
none seem to offer a clear path for an American economy that has
252. See, e.g., RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 370
(endorsing the communitarian vision of corporate purpose, namely that profit
seeking should not come before health and wellness); see also NOVAK, SPIRIT,
supra note 17, at 93 (arguing that successful management will draw out ideals
of teamwork, cooperation, and creativity).
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become less innovative, offers less robust job growth, and spurred
a growing divide between the very rich and everyone else.
Niebuhr suggests deep skepticism that markets, morals, or
fiddling with corporate law rules within the existing structure of
business corporations are likely to move us very far in pushing
business enterprises to more actively pursue the public
interest.253
Less stale is the movement towards social enterprise,
including new legal forms like the benefit corporation. But here
too, Niebuhr (and to a significant extent Rauschenbusch as well)
suggests that the focus so far has been too much on fiddling with
the rules of corporate purpose and duty.254 We should instead be
looking at voting and representation: who has actual authority, or
the ability to choose those with actual authority, in a corporation?
What might than mean?
That’s a topic for another day.

253. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing that law is
perhaps an inadequate approach to making business enterprises actively pursue
the public good because the immorality of man can and will leech into the law
itself).
254. See RAUSCHENBUSCH, SOCIAL CRISIS, supra note 24, at 406–07
(discussing the two-class system of modern capitalism); see also NIEBUHR,
MORAL MAN, supra note 26, at 60 (arguing that self interest, greed, and pride
are too deeply engrained into human character to be rooted out by laws and
regulations).

